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Abstract 
Special arrangements were made by the European Union for decision-making 
on the possible accession of Romania and Bulgaria. A regime of extra 
procedures was added to the arrangements used for the Eastern European 
countries which joined the Union in 2004. This paper examines how the 
process worked out in the Romanian justice sector, which had been identified 
as a key area for reform to meet minimum EU requirements. We examine the 
discourses at policy and program levels and in three selected projects, including 
at design stage, interim report stage, and final report stage. Our discourse 
analysis of project documents pays special attention to the key structuring 
device used in the EU’s project and program planning: the ‘logical framework’ 
or ‘project matrix’. Intended as a key discipline on project design, 
implementation and evaluation, its inherent limitations and typical biases in 
usage can lead to major divergences between project and design. A 
technocratic language of planning can then in various ways serve as a cover 
that justifies whatever happened. We examine the language use and associated 
behaviour, as a contribution to the understanding both of Romanian accession 
in the face of sceptical European public opinion and of a methodology in 
worldwide use. 
 
Keywords 
Romania EU accession; European Union 5th enlargement; justice sector 
reform; logical framework approach; project cycle management; interpretive 
policy analysis 
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Romania’s accession process into the European 
Union 
Discourses at policy-, program-, and project- levels 
in the justice sector 1 
1 Introduction 
In 1995, Romania submitted its application for European Union membership. 
Accession negotiations were opened in February 2000, together with Bulgaria 
and with several countries that joined the Union in 2004. Romania and 
Bulgaria joined three years later, in 2007. This two-part expansion of the EU is 
known as the Fifth Enlargement. 
The twelve year long process for Romania and Bulgaria was marked by 
considerable tensions. European Union (EU) leaders were keen to absorb 
these two countries, rather than see them take the route of Belarus or of Serbia 
under Milosevic and choose for renewed affiliation with Russia. A still longer 
process might have endangered accession, for many reasons. The EU was keen 
also to ‘regularise’ two states immediately adjacent to the new enlarging Union, 
states of absorbable size but large enough to provide interesting markets and to 
cause significant disruption if they were major centres of crime, trafficking and 
conflict. The EU leadership wished yet to ensure true ‘Europeanisation’, not 
the entry of Trojan Horses of ‘Balkan darkness’. (See Hansen 2006 on the 
history of West European stereotypes and image formation concerning ‘the 
Balkans’). It sought to enforce the details of EU models on countries that were 
seen as backward and to whom the EU could dictate. This was essential also to 
reassure uneasy West European public opinion, such as manifested in the 2005 
rejections of the proposed EU constitution. On the other side, the candidate 
countries were keen to quickly enter the safe haven of the EU, with its huge 
networks, opportunities and schemes of support especially to poorer members; 
while proud of their own prior ‘European-ness’ and capabilities, and not 
willing to be dictated to. Mediating this field of tensions was the edifice of 
Accession policy, criteria and instruments. 
Special arrangements were introduced by the EU for decision-making on 
the possible accession of Romania and Bulgaria. A regime of extra procedures 
was added to the arrangements, such as extensive support to key sectors, that 
were already applied to the Central and Eastern European countries which 
joined the Union in 2004; including ‘partnerships’ with mentor countries, and 
intensified monitoring of progress; plus a provision to delay entry if progress 
was not according to the agreed timetable. This paper examines how the 
process worked out in the case of the Romanian justice sector, which had been 
identified as a key area for reform to meet minimum EU requirements. It 
                                                 
1 This is a revised version of paper presented at the 3rd International Conference in 
Interpretive Policy Analysis, 19-21 June 2008, University of Essex, UK, and a seminar 
for Jim Bjőrkman at ISS, 28 November 2008. We thank Sylvia Bergh, Karim Knio, 
and several conference session and seminar participants for useful advice. 
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examines the discourses at policy and program levels and in three selected 
projects, including at design stage and evaluation stage.  
The application of forms of discourse analysis to project and program 
documents is relatively unusual. We extend it here to the key structuring device 
used in EU project and program planning (and very widely internationally): the 
‘logical framework’ or project matrix. Intended as a key discipline on project 
design, implementation and evaluation, we show how its inherent limits (such 
as absence of reference to unintended effects, and static character) together 
with typical biases in usage (top down, monological, rigid: following a single set 
of objectives declared by the formally stronger partner) can lead to major 
divergences between it and the reality of events. At later stages, the 
technocratic language of planning can become a cover that helps to justify 
almost whatever has happened: including through focusing on the (reported) 
fulfilment of lower level targets such as numbers of people who have attended 
training courses, as if these figures are strong proxies for the intended effects; 
and through sheer repetition of stereotypical technocratic formulations and 
paper volume of reporting. We examine the language use and associated 
behaviour, as a contribution to the understanding of a major planning 
methodology used worldwide and of Romanian accession in the face of 
sceptical EU public opinion. 
2 Romania in the 5th EU Enlargement process, 2000-2007 
In order to join the European Union, a candidate member state has to be 
voted in by each existing Member State and to fulfil the economic and political 
conditions that are called the Copenhagen Criteria (1993). These require that 
the candidate country has achieved ‘stability of institutions guaranteeing 
democracy, the rule of law, human rights and the respect for and protection of 
minorities; the existence of a functioning market economy as well as the 
capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the 
Union; the ability to take on the obligations of membership, including 
adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union’.2 In 
particular the candidate country must fully adopt the acquis communautaire, 
the body of EU law and policy frameworks.3 The emphasis on full ‘acquis 
transposition’ illustrates, for many commentators, that EU strategy is based on 
a ‘top-down direction of the process’ and that in the accession negotiations the 
candidate countries are simple consumers of the products and the medicine, 
without any rights for negotiating the strategy content (Papadimitriou, 2006:7).   
Adoption of the acquis communautaire requires adjustment of the 
candidate state’s le-gal framework to respect all EU legislation. Adjustment of 
                                                 
2 http://europa.eu/scadplus/glossary/accession_criteria.en/25.09.2007. 
3 The acquis “‘comprises not only Community law in the strict sense, but also all acts 
adopted under the second and third pillars of the European Union and the common 
objectives laid down in the Treaties…. To integrate into the European Union, 
applicant countries will have to transpose the acquis into their national legislation and 
implement it from the moment of their accession.”’ 
(http://europa.eu/scadplus/glossary/community_acquis_en.htm/25.09.2007) 
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legislation is not enough: the institutions responsible for implementing and 
applying the acquis typically need to be strengthened. In order to sustain the 
efforts of candidate countries not having enough institutional capacity for 
policy formulation, but showing commitment to become part of the 
Enlargement, the Union designed detailed ‘road-maps’ to show them the way 
in reform implementation. Together with a policy of ‘carrots and sticks’, it was 
an innova-tion for the countries in the Fifth Enlargement. A ‘road maps’ 
initiative was begun for Romania in 2002.  
Pre-Accession Partnerships are legal instruments defining relations 
between the Union and the candidate countries. They fix short and medium-
term priorities for each candidate country and specify resources which they can 
draw on for their preparations. A variety of programs, such as PHARE pre-
accession assistance and the Transition Facility, were offered to Romania to 
strengthen its administration and ensure implementation of the acquis. The 
Transition Facility was to provide tools to remedy the weakness of institutions 
involved in ‘acquis transposition’. One tool is ‘twinning’, which involves 
secondment of advisers from one or more Member States to a sector deemed 
to require guidance in the candidate country. These ‘Pre-accession Advisers’ 
may be officials from a Member State or hired advisers. They train their 
counterparts in the candidate countries in adoption and implementation in key 
sectors of the acquis.4  
In the pre-accession stage, the Romanian government launched the 
National Program for the Adoption of the Acquis (NPAA) in order to 
implement the European Commission’s recommendations.5 The lead areas 
needing strengthened institutional capacity were identified as in Justice and 
Home Affairs (JHA). But progress registered within the pre-accession stage 
was slow. Upgrading of the public administration was a centrepiece of EU 
conditionality, yet just a year before the admission decision ‘the successive EC 
Regular Reports stated that the Romanian public administration is 
characterized by cumbersome procedures, a lack of professionalism and 
inadequate remuneration’ (Jora, 2006:15). The monitoring reports during 2002-
5 also mentioned constantly as areas for improvement the judicial system, 
anticorruption strategy, external border controls, and law enforcement 
capacity. There was a consistent tension between the pessimistic tone by EU 
officials in internal reports and the optimistic tone adopted in the public arena. 
The latter prevailed during the stages of decision in 2004-5: the seniormost EU 
leaders and Commission officials settled on a tone of qualified optimism that 
led to conditional acceptance of Romanian entry by the Member States. The 
Accession Treaty was signed by the 25 Member States, Romania and Bulgaria 
in April 2005.  
A series of specific conditions remained to be fulfilled by Romania and 
Bulgaria in order to become EU members in 2007. These included for example 
for Romania: ‘The development and the implementation of an updated and 
integrated Action Plan and Strategy for the reform of the judiciary… The 
considerable acceleration of the fight against corruption and specifically against 
                                                 
4 http://europa.eu/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/l60020.htm/25.05.2008 
5 See Annex 3 for a list of acronyms. 
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the high-level corruption by ensuring the strict application of the anti-
corruption legislation and the effective independence of the National Anti-
Corruption Prosecutor’s Office’.6 Non-fulfilment would allow EU member 
states to defer or veto Romanian entry. The Commission published monitoring 
reports twice a year during 2005-2007, ‘in order to ensure that this country can 
meet all duties and requirements of a full-fledged member’ (COM (2005) 534 
final).7  
Towards the end of this extended monitoring period, rather than 
postpone the date of accession to 2008 or veto both countries on grounds that 
they had not fulfilled the criteria, the Commission promoted ‘a mechanism of 
accompanying measures - for a limited number of areas where they need to see 
further progress in the months leading up to accession and beyond accession - 
as well as a mechanism for cooperation and verification of progress in the 
areas of judicial reform and the fight against corruption and organized crime’ 
(Rehn 2006a; emphasis added). This was an innovative solution found at a time 
of confusion and dilemmas after the EU constitution referendum, over 
whether Romania and Bulgaria could join the EU in 2007 ‘without 
compromising the proper functioning of EU policies and institutions’ (Rehn 
2006b). Based on the progress declared and the hypothesis that improvements 
would continue to be made in the sectors with deficiencies in implementation 
of the reforms, Romania and Bulgaria were accepted as Member States of the 
EU from the 1st of January 2007.  
The 5th EU Enlargement thus strained the rules that governed the four 
previous enlargements, and was characterised by resort to new measures, 
especially for Romania and Bulgaria during the second part of the 
Enlargement. For example, ‘the pre-accession safeguard clauses emerged as a 
clever instrument designed by the Commission in order to keep an effective 
pressure on the candidates and to conciliate the worries of some Member 
States’ (Jora 2006:12). Critical judgments have appeared concerning the 
objectivity of the criteria used to measure the performance of candidate 
countries. Kochenov argues that the Copenhagen Criteria system ‘clearly failed 
with respect to democracy and a constitutional state’ and that ‘the Union is 
operating on a slippery slope of vague causal links and fuzzy definitions.’ 
(Kochenov, 2007:3). 
Does the EU’s accession strategy ensure coherence, through from 
formulation of objectives and of support offered to the candidate country, via 
stages of implementation and evaluation of progress, through to argumentation 
of a proposal for accession? An opposite hypothesis to consider could be that 
the EU’s approach, including its proclamation of and declared adoption of a 
package of best practices, formed a ritual of validation; in other words, that 
there was only one possible political outcome (accession), almost regardless of 
what was done and produced within the process. Could outcomes always be 
sufficiently beautified by layers of vacuous reporting of presumed proxy 
variables and by optimistic projections based on heroic assumptions about the 
power of EU procedures and models? In an intermediate possible 
                                                 
6 http://www.infoeuropa.ro/25.05.2008 
7 http://delegatie.infoeuropa.ro /ROMR2005.pdf/25.05.2008 
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interpretation, the mindset which produces such pressure to report successes 
could also generate a top-down style that diverts attention from real potentials 
and real steps for relevant locally rooted advances.  
We will look at the language of the EU’s proposed ‘best practice’ package 
of admission components and procedures, made up of objective sounding 
generalisations and of systems for instrumental rationality supposed to 
implement the package. Specifically, we look at how its ‘Project Cycle 
Management’ language was understood and applied in the Romanian field of 
justice, in particular the judiciary sector, in the process of implementing the 
acquis communautaire. Reform of the judiciary had been highlighted in a 
safeguard clause that was applied only to Romania.  
As examples of the innovative conditions used in the fifth Enlargement 
process, particularly for Romania, we look at pre-accession twinning programs 
in this field. Twinning can be seen as exemplying the intended spirit and 
rationale of European cooperation. We examine a set of three such projects 
that had as their overall objective to strengthen the functioning of the 
Romanian judiciary. Together they formed a project ‘fiche’ related to priority 
areas for the judiciary underlined in the National Program for Adoption of the 
Acquis.8 The investigation casts light on how the Copenhagen criteria for entry 
are operationalised and applied in practice, and to what extent their use could 
become a ritual validation of performance.  
Before presenting the case study, in Sections 4 and 5, we must examine 
the framework which the European Commission specified for planning and 
management of activities that request EU support. 
3 Authoritative Policy Implemented in Managerialist 
Mode: - become like us by doing what we say 
Policy language seeks to enforce authority and order across a broad field of 
activity. In the traditional ideal-type, a centre deemed to have legitimate 
authority declares clear goals, whose implications are then derived through an 
exercise of instrumental rationality, to establish justified stable patterns for 
action (Colebatch 1998). This traditional model of policy seeks to extend an 
intra-organizational form of hierarchical management, such as from an army, 
to intra-societal and inter-societal coordination. How far the asserted authority 
and declared set of appropriate actions will be respected, within the vertical 
line of command, and especially outside it, remains to be seen in each case. 
Not only do many agents lie beyond the direct authority of any single centre, 
the centre itself is plural and typically has multiple conflicting objectives. In the 
                                                 
8 We distinguish ‘policy’, ‘program’ and ‘project’. ‘Policy’ applies to a sector (e.g. 
Justice and Home Affairs), field (e.g., Justice) or higher level. ‘Program’ refers to a 
broad grouping of activity within a field. It may include a number of ‘ projects’ (each 
of which is a focused set of planned expenditures). The terms program and project are 
however sometimes used interchangeably, since for the EU a ‘project’ is an 
administrative grouping of expenditure. A ‘project fiche’ contains a number of 
projects and is what we otherwise call a program. 
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EU’s Fifth Enlargement, for example, the Union sought a rigorous adherence 
to ‘the European model’ but also a fairly rapid accession for the candidate 
states. 
3.1 Carrots, sticks, and sermons 
The EU employed an arsenal of methods and instruments for financial and 
economic control over candidate countries (CCs) in the Fifth Enlargement. 
Conditionality was a key feature. EU pre-accession strategy has been to seek 
the ‘right mix of carrots and sticks’ (Jora, 2006:1), or ‘carrots, sticks and 
sermons’ if we use the typology of policy instruments by Bemelmans-Videc et 
al. Regulations (allied to ‘sticks’), economic means (‘carrots’), and advocacy, 
information and exhortation (‘sermons’) are tools used by all governments to 
achieve compliance after ‘a decision has been made that some form of 
government intervention is justified’ and now has to be enforced or promoted 
rather than further negotiated (Bemelmans-Videc, Rist & Vedung, 1998:30). In 
the case of accession to the EU, the sticks mainly consist of withholding access 
to carrots (Ionita & Freyberg-Inan 2008); however, as we will see, the EU has 
in the past typically been keen that applicants will indeed eat plenty of carrots 
and will join. The carrots (projects and programs) that are intended to 
encourage, enable and enact acceptance of new regulations must be designed 
through a standardised set of procedures called ‘Project Cycle Management’, 
that represents a leading exemplar of managerialist thinking: a particular sort of 
‘sermon’ that is found in the project and policy documents and the associated 
manuals and speeches. 
‘Managerialism’ is an ideology of professional ‘management’ based on 
private sector management experience which sets explicit standards and 
measures of performance and emphasizes output controls (Hood, 1995). The 
language of managerialism consists in large part of normative statements about 
how managers at different levels should possess the following: 
a) A clear view of their objectives, and instruments to assess and wherever 
possible measure outputs and performance in relation to those objectives; 
b) Well defined responsibility for making the best use of their resources, 
including a critical scrutiny of outputs and value for money; 
c)  The information (particularly about costs), the training, and the access to 
expert advice which they need to exercise their responsibilities effectively 
(Pollitt, 1993:4). 
Managerialism can be considered as an ideology, firstly in the sense of a 
set of beliefs and ideas that belong to a specific group and social arrangement, 
and that are systematically structured, developed and maintained in order to 
provide a justification for the preferred behaviour of their proponents (Hartley 
1983; discussed by Pollitt, 1993:7-11). Secondly, it often hides important issues, 
from its proponents as well as from others. The objectives established as ‘the 
project objectives’ or ‘the policy’s objectives’ are often not recognised as the 
objectives chosen by the ostensibly most powerful participants, the process 
controllers, objectives which are not necessarily held for the project or policy 
by other stakeholder groups. Managerialism involves attempted enforcement 
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of the view of objectives held by a particular authoritative group, and seeks to 
consolidate and extend their authority over other groups. 
Managerialist approaches in the ‘carrots, sticks and sermons’ mode are 
broadly used internationally. David Ellerman’s theory of autonomy-respecting 
assistance provides a critique based on observing the record of World Bank 
development assistance approaches and the similar approaches adopted by 
most other external development funders in the 1980s and 1990s and to a large 
extent still today (Ellerman, 2004, 2005). The funders presumed that they knew 
better, indeed far better, than recipients what the latter required; for were they 
not far more successful? They craved, and correspondingly presumed the real 
existence of, valid standard rules of good economic, political and 
administrative practice; and they sought to enforce the supposed general 
principles, as seen and interpreted by them, upon struggling low-income 
countries whose dependence had been further increased by high energy prices, 
debt crises, technological change, out- and in-migration, and other structural 
features and trends in the world economy. Detailed commitments were laid 
down in loan agreements and project designs, and policed through machineries 
of monitoring and evaluation. The record of two decades of such carrot-stick-
and-sermon was very disappointing. The prescriptions produced in Northern 
headquarters were insufficient to fit the varied and changing realities of and in 
each developing country; mechanisms of learning, to try to find out and build 
on what really worked in specific local circumstances, were deficient, while 
monitoring and evaluation were geared more to checking that generalized 
prescriptions designed in the North were adhered to; and the energies and 
ideas of participants in the South were too often ignored, suppressed or 
diverted into short-term self-enrichment or out-migration. Ellerman’s Helping 
People to Help Themselves (2005) proposes an alternative set of principles for 
the relationships between helpers and doers, so as to build the autonomous 
and mature capacity of the doer.  
Compared to the World Bank, the EU is seen by Ghaziri (2007:131) as an 
actor of middle ranking on the axis of managerialism, ‘in the process of policy 
making adopting the general discourse of the World Bank and IMF premised 
on economic, fiscal and managerial reform’ (Ghaziri, 2007:184). In recent 
years, the EU has declared that it will ease its labyrinthine procedures for 
external cooperation, in recognition of the enormous transaction costs 
imposed on partner countries and the insufficient responsiveness to their 
needs, priorities and feelings of ownership (see e.g. the EU’s PCM Guidelines 
of 2004). Little of this applied however in the Fifth Enlargement, which was 
already underway and involved the minute ‘transposition’ of a single model of 
EU laws and practices. 
3.2 The logical framework approach 
The logical framework approach (LFA) is an important instrument of 
managerialism, though in some contexts of use it is employed more flexibly 
and democratically. Devised by consultants working for USAID around 1970, 
it progressively spread worldwide in international development cooperation 
projects and also in some domestic uses (e.g., in some corners of local 
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government). ‘The logframe’ and ‘logframing’ became standard, compulsory, 
preoccupations. In the 1980s major refinements were made by the German 
development cooperation agency GTZ, many of which were absorbed in the 
1990s into the European Commission’s model of ‘Project Cycle Management’. 
A framework created for development cooperation, a context of strong power-
hierarchies, was available then for use in the EU’s relations with the post-
Soviet world, including with states seeking entry to the Union. 
LFA centrally contains, first, a method to logically derive a hierarchy of 
objectives from a problem-situation analysis; and second, a format for project 
design and description that meets the need of central funding-agency managers 
for a concise overview of the project’s activities and purposes, with emphasis 
on instruments for monitoring progress and compliance in relation to pre-set 
objectives and targets. This second feature is the approach’s best known face 
and is what concerns us here: the project-matrix format, used through the 
stages of design, contracting, monitoring and evaluation. The frame has 
evolved remarkably little. The EU’s version in 2002, when the projects we will 
examine were designed, differed only slightly from the USAID matrix of 1970. 
The same applies for the current version, from 2004. 
The EU matrix has four columns and four rows. The first column gives a 
hierarchy of objectives: 1 – planned Activities, 2 – planned Outputs/Results, 
which should contribute importantly towards 3 –  the intended 
Purpose/Immediate Objective of the project, which should similarly 
contribute towards 4 – the intended Overall/Higher/Wider Objective. Levels 
1 and 2 represent the project itself, and levels 3 and 4 represent the effects it is 
supposed to lead to. But achievements at those higher levels depend on the 
operation of forces outside the project’s control. So indeed do achievements at 
the lower levels, though to a significantly lesser degree.  
Forces outside project control are to be considered in the matrix’s fourth 
column, where relevant assumptions about key external factors should be 
identified. The assumptions should be ones that are not self-evidently valid and 
thus not worth mentioning, (such as ‘the sun will continue to shine during the 
next ten years’), nor ones that are clearly unrealistic (such as ‘members of the 
EU will no longer give high priority to their own national interests, from next 
year’). A design that is found to require clearly unrealistic assumptions should 
be abandoned. The assumptions in a good design are plausible judgements 
about key issues which the project planners have considered with care, but 
which deserve continuing attention.  
The ‘vertical logic’ of the matrix consists of a linked series of propositions, 
each in the following form: If intentions are fulfilled at level X in the 
objectives-hierarchy (first column) and assumptions are fulfilled as specified in 
the corresponding cell of the assumptions column (fourth column), then 
intentions will be fulfilled at level X+1, the next higher level. Only if these 
propositions are coherent, and the assumptions are realistic, is the design in 
fact logical. Strangely the vertical logic thus concerns two maximally separated 
columns in the matrix. This reflects, firstly, the emergence of LFA from 
engineering design procedures in USA in the 1960s, where there were 
expectations of high control within the area of engineering action, and 
secondly, the associated preoccupation of control engineers – and foreign aid 
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managers – with close monitoring of the achievement of intended objectives 
rather than a prime focus on monitoring the fulfilment of assumptions, let 
alone on the occurrence of unintended effects. So, between the first and fourth 
columns sit two columns for monitoring performance in terms of intended 
effects. The second column specifies indicators and, typically, even targets for 
such performance; and the third specifies where the required information for 
checking will be found. Each row should be logically coherent (the ‘horizontal 
logic’): the indicator should be valid and reliable for showing the project’s 
distinct contribution at that level; and the source of information too should be 
relevant, reliable and feasible. 
The danger arises that the checking of vertical logic is disrupted by the 
interposition of the performance monitoring apparatus. With the assumptions 
column marginalised at the end of the format, assumptions checking can 
become superficial or absent. Vertical logic then becomes outweighed and 
undermined by the priority to monitoring. This is partly disguised, for a project 
design with a rigorous but irrelevant vertical logic can be readily produced: ‘If 
the assumptions required for project success are present then the project will 
be successful’. The assumptions column is easily filled with lists of wishful 
thinking – or not filled at all, thanks to an implicit meta-assumption that the 
project exists in isolation from other forces. A method intended to encourage 
systematic realistic thought can lead towards the cheerful but unhelpful chorus 
that: ‘The best results will be reached given the best conditions (/best 
intentions).’ One of us has called this the ‘lack-frame’ syndrome (Gasper, 1999; 
2000b). 
The typical preoccupation with performance monitoring of a narrow type 
(asking ‘Have you done exactly what you contracted to do?’, rather than ‘What 
important results and costs have occurred as a result of the project?’) involves 
neglect of ‘side-effects’. It implies managerial indifference to other people’s 
objectives and ignores what may be the main effects (Gasper 2000a). Further, 
the elaborate project design can become not a basis for ongoing systematic and 
creative thinking, responding to emergent new information, ideas and 
challenges, but a restrictive and rigid contract, intended by a mistrustful funder 
for control of a supposedly unreliable recipient. This is the ‘lock-frame’ 
syndrome, whereby recipients are held accountable (at least on paper) to a 
partly outdated system of objectives.  
The logical framework is a very simple format, a one-table overview of a 
complex of practices. For the convenience of head offices, it tries to reduce all 
projects to the same pattern, in which just a few steps will take us from 
tangible inputs through to broad development objectives. Like any simple tool 
for dealing with complexity it then needs careful handling. Well used, it can 
help; crudely used, it can mislead. But even in the latter case, the method’s 
intensive language of objectives and indicators may help to legitimate plans and 
activity, even when they are poorly conceived (cf. Colebatch, 1998). 
Annex 1 shows the matrix for a cluster of three projects in the Romanian 
justice sector. The Overall Objective could perhaps be reformulated as 
‘Compliance with EU models and procedures’, and beyond it is implied a 
further objective of ‘Achievement of European norms of performance’. Those 
higher objectives are immutable, politically given criteria, derived not from a 
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situation analysis but from the given vision of the EU and accepted by the 
candidate country in its request for membership. 
3.3 The EU instruments and procedures for institution 
building in candidate countries 
Three main sources of expertise and financial assistance were provided by the 
EU for a candidate country (CC): the PHARE program for building capacity, 
ISPA for structural policy support and SAPARD in the agriculture field. 
PHARE programs have two main priorities: institution building and 
investment.9 The institution building work concerns components and 
processes that strengthen the economic, social, regulatory and administrative 
capacity of the CC in line with EU standards (SEC/1999/1596 final:4). 
‘Structures, strategies, human resources and management skills’ are necessary 
resources for ‘the implementation of the acquis communautaire and the 
preparation of a coherent policy in line with the principle of economic and 
social cohesion [sic]; the fulfilling of the first Copenhagen Criterion: the 
stability of the institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human 
rights and respect for and protection of minorities’ (ibid.). ‘Twinning’ is one 
PHARE instrument in institution building, for transfer of expertise and 
knowledge from particular member state countries to a candidate country. 
Procedures required by the Commission are laid down in exhaustive 
manuals. Commission manuals and its documents as a whole characteristically 
use decisive, doubt-free language. The continually repeated term ‘guaranteed’, 
for example, comes to refer not only to mechanisms of checking and support 
but helps to convey a certainty of fulfilment. 
While the Commission in Brussels supervised the procedures, its 
implementation tasks were delegated to its Delegation in the CC. During the 
pre-accession stage, the Delegation was vested with most financial and contract 
management decision power. Monitoring of program implementation was 
checked by a Joint Monitoring Committee composed by representatives of the 
CC and the Commission. ‘In order to ensure the effectiveness of monitoring, 
each Financing Memorandum will incorporate objectively verifiable and 
measurable indicators of achievements with regard to financial and physical 
inputs, activities, outputs and objectives and the timescale for implementation.’ 
(SEC/1999/1596 final, art 5.2: 14).  
The following sections consider how the EC method was applied in the 
Romanian field of justice. 
a) First, we situate the design of projects within the political context; looking 
at the Romanian field of justice as treated in the EU’s policy formulation 
(Section 4.1), and at the influence of the EU’s design format (the ‘logical 
framework’ approach) (Section 4.2). We will consider the extent to which 
the programs offered were based on two-way interaction or a one-way 
approach, and later how this affected their achievements in terms of 
building capacity. 
                                                 
9 http://europa.eu/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/l60020.htm/25.05.2008 
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b) Specifically, we analyse the project matrix (2002/3) for a cluster project 
with three twinning components concerning key institutions in the 
judiciary sector, to see how far it was built in a coherent manner (Section 
4.2; program design) 
c) Next, we analyse an interim evaluation (2004/5) of one project from the 
cluster -- the PHARE Twinning project between Romania and the 
Netherlands: ‘Assistance in strengthening the independence and 
functioning of the Romanian judiciary system’ – in order to find out what 
the program design had neglected or marginalized (Section 4.3; 
program/project implementation) 
d) Lastly, we review the evaluation done for the cluster (2005); we will look at 
the interpretation of data and at limitations of the method used, namely 
the scheme of evaluation prescribed by the Commission (Section 5; 
program evaluation). 
In other words, we will look at the planning, implementation and evaluation 
within a designated top priority field and sector, with special attention to 
reforms in a priority sub sector, the judiciary; and in particular at the attempts 
to transform the key institutions that represent and promote the independence 
and efficacy of the judiciary. 
4 The EC Method Applied in the Romanian Justice Sector 
– Policy, Program and Project Design 
4.1 The policy design in relation to EU priorities and the 
Romanian justice sector 
For the European Commission, the first step in planning is identification of 
the needs or problems in a policy sector. In the case of accession to the EU, 
the ‘needs’ are identified according to the degree of divergence from the EU 
model, and are specified in a ‘road-map’. In line with the Roadmap 
recommendations, Romania adopted in 2003 a comprehensive Strategy aiming 
to reform the field of justice (Government Decision no. 1052/2003). The 
objectives covered by the strategy address the following: 
Legal certainty: increase impartiality, transparency, credibility and 
effective-ness; create a unitary jurisprudence; complete transposition of 
the acquis com-munautaire in the field of justice; improve the judicial 
system’s capacity in ap-plying the law and consolidate the 
administrative capacity; continue the process of penitentiary system 
reform.  
Quality of judgements: reasonable periods of time for trials; structural 
changes of the judicial system organisation, aimed at restructuring 
courts and prosecu-tor’s offices based on criteria of effectiveness 
together with the specialisation of certain courts and prosecutor’s 
offices to solve cases in special matters; reform the administration of 
justice and ensure the resources necessary to the accom-plishment of 
the justice act; professional training for magistrates and auxiliary 
personnel. 
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Independence of the judiciary: ensure the transparency of judicial activity, by 
interaction with civil society; define the prerogatives of the Superior 
Council of the Magistracy (SCM) and of the Ministry of Justice, in 
order to consolidate the independence of the judiciary; establish the 
magistrates’ statute – their rights and obligations. (Fiche projects 2004-
06).10 
To move to create an independent judiciary system in line with EU standards, 
the Romanian government took both legislative and organizational initiatives. 
To separate legislative and executive power, an independent Superior Council 
of Magistrates (SCM) was established, autonomous from the Ministry of 
Justice. For educating the magistrates in European law, a similarly independent 
National Institute of Magistrates (NIM) emerged. The two organisations 
benefited from technical and financial support from the EC, including 
cooperation with experts from different member states.  
As a result, in 2003 the revised Accession Partnership with Romania 
recommended the following measures in the field of justice: ‘Develop and 
implement a strategy for the reform of the judiciary that will: ensure full 
independence in particular by: establishing a transparent system for recruiting 
and selecting magistrates. Enhance the professionalism of the judiciary in 
particular by: improving training programs in the National Institute for the 
Magistracy (NIM): strengthening the ability of the National School of [Court] 
Clerks’ (Fiche projects 2004-2006, ibid.). These recommendations and the 
objectives of the Strategy paper became tasks for senior managers, 
departments and autonomous institutions such as NIM and SCM.  
Of 15 projects designed for the justice and home affairs field already in 
2002, three projects were for strengthening NIM and SCM. These projects are 
the object of our analysis11, from the stage of project design (2002/2003) to the 
stages of implementation (2004-2005) and mid-term evaluation (2005). The 
three together constituted a project ‘fiche’, or, in our terms, a program: 
 A: RO 02/IB/JH-01 ‘Strengthening the functioning of the Romanian 
Judiciary and its representative body – Superior Council of Magistrates’ 
(18 months):  
 B. RO 02/IB/JH–02 ‘Further Assistance for the Development of NIM 
and TCC’ (18 months; TCC is the Training Centre for Court Clerks);  
 C: RO02/IB/JH-03 ‘Creating and strengthening conflict analysis and 
resolution capacities by introducing alternative means to the judiciary in 
solving civil and commercial cases’ (6 months).  
Implementation was due to begin in July 2003, with Components A and B due 
to continue through 2004, while Component C would finish at the end of 
2003. In practice most such projects start with a delay of at least several 
                                                 
10 http/europa.eu.int/comm./enlargement/fiche_project/index.cfm /23.09.2007) 
11 The program is selected at random out of those which had adequate accessibility 
but not chosen as a prototype for the Justice sector. Our assumption though is that 
any projects in this field should score high and show strong performance since the 
sector was under the closest supervision by the EC. 
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months, often a year (cf. Papadimitrou & Phinnemore 2004). Component B 
which we focus on in section 4.3 started with a delay of about six months. 
4.2 Investigating the logic of program design: reading the 
program matrix 
In investigating the logic of the program matrix, which is given in Annex 1, 
one might distinguish the limitations of the method behind the matrix – rooted 
in its philosophical approach and its conception of policy processes – and 
deficiencies in how the method was understood and applied. In practice it is 
difficult to fully separate these, but we start with some matters that can be seen 
as poor use of the logical framework approach, then turn to issues that reflect 
the parameters of this policy exercise and others that show limitations of the 
method. 
A. The manner in which the matrix is filled reflects that the guidelines are confusing, ignored 
or difficult to apply: 
1. The vacuous correspondence between vertical levels. The matrix mixes levels into a 
confusing and overcrowded scheme. The relation of results and activities 
appears as tautological. For example, intended results are described such as ‘In-
service training curricula of NIM improved’ and the corresponding activity 
simply repeats the idea: ‘to improve the design of the in service training 
curricula of NIM…’. 
2. Vacuous indicators. The objectively verifiable indicators are merely 
restatements of the overall objectives, with the same level of generalization and 
close or similar meaning. For example, the project purpose (in component A) 
‘Institutional capacity and functioning of SCM enhanced in line with EU 
requirements’ has as its objectively verifiable indicator ‘By 2005 the SCM will 
be strengthened in line with EU requirements’. Such vacuous indicators are 
rhetoric of managerial assertion, in place of scientific substance. 
3. Absent indicators. As we move away in either direction from the Results level 
in this matrix approved by the Commission, the indicators column becomes 
empty. At Activities level this is perhaps because in the EC’s schema Inputs are 
(rather misleadingly) taken as the indicators for Activities. But at the higher 
levels too, no meaningful indicators are given. The supposed connectors with 
the empirical reality are not in place.  
4. Vague formulations within a ritual of validation. Items mentioned under the 
sources of verification include vague references in eclectic style: ‘reports; 
statistics; annual’. (This is typical of other such projects too.) Correspondingly, 
the manner of verification and time references were barely referred to in the 
later reports during program implementation. This makes the language of 
verification one of ritual validation, not of real comparison. There is no serious 
correspondence to the empirical level. If for example the objective given in the 
design was that ‘100 magistrates will be trained by 2005’, the 2005 report will 
dutifully remark ‘100 magistrates were trained’. 
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B. Top-down approach  
1. Constantly reiterated in the design matrix are the words ‘in line with EU 
requirements’. The design of the project starts from priorities which have been 
externally fixed a priori as a political agenda, so the needs that it addresses are 
given and not negotiated. They follow from the ‘road-map’, the EU 
prescription. The actual needs of beneficiaries of the project and the insertion 
of the scheme into local reality are not investigated in the phase of design.  
2. As part of a top-down perspective, the design shows extreme simplification. 
It vaults from mundane inputs to vast objectives in just three or four steps. 
3. Due to the top-down approach and prescriptive rules fixed by EU, the 
concept formulation is stereotypical and oversimplified. For example, one 
ambition is ‘to strengthen the Romanian judicial system in line with the EU 
model’. ‘The EU model’ is the prototype. Yet, in practice, ‘the EU model’ must 
be created in a specific context and must blend expertise coming from 
European experts from different countries, who interpret ‘it’ differently.12  In 
Twinning projects, including this one, the expertise is sometimes offered by 
two MS countries and the ‘unity’ of ‘the EU model’ is an issue of negotiation. 
The model gets born ad-hoc out of an encounter between different expertises, 
as a compromise or according to the values of whoever was able to impose his 
will. Besides the fact that in reality the ‘EU has no EU  model with which it 
can ask the accession country to comply, there is no methodology for how to 
put these abstract principles into practice or how to monitor their 
implementation in the developing public administration as  there is no acquis 
in the field the acceding countries must implement .’ (Ionita & Freyberg-Inan, 
2008: 21).  
C. Mechanicist determination: one cause → one effect. The program contains three 
project components each with a similar overall objective: ‘Contribution to the 
improvement of the Romanian judicial system’. This box is easy to fill in. But 
elsewhere the design stresses separate statements of objectives per project. A 
one cause → one effect mechanism is the only type considered. How the 
overall objective is then ‘guaranteed’? Although the final objective is shared by 
the three components, the scheme lacks a system of convergent action for 
achieving compatibility and convergence in other objectives, actions and 
results of the components. The degree to which the relevant Copenhagen 
criteria can be reached as result of the convergent actions of these three 
projects remains questionable. 
D. The marginalisation and trivialisation of attention to factors which will prevent fulfilment 
of the intended results. The sequence of the horizontal chain is: Objective – 
measure (verifiable indicator) – sources of verification – assumptions. 
Assumptions come last. We saw that this arrangement can endanger serious 
attention to assumptions and generate propositions of the form ‘the best result 
will be obtained under the best conditions’. In the program under study the 
                                                 
12 As stated for the project implementation level (Project Covenant, component B) 
“Romania’s experts will meet both French and Dutch experts to compare their 
systems and  will develop its national strategy  according to the EU standards  deriving 
from these comparisons.” (Project Covenant: 29) 
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danger intensifies, for the higher objectives are formulated as mandatory. The 
assumptions that are examined and stated may then be restricted to those 
required to reinforce commitment to the given destination: they must ‘fulfil the 
prophecy’. Consequently, alternative scenarios will not be seriously discussed, 
and the possible failure of the proposal is effectively ignored. 
Table 2 shows that these features apply to the Romanian judiciary case, by 
considering the assumptions formulated in the last column of the matrix.. 
TABLE 2 
 Assumptions formulation in the program design stage, for the three-project fiche 
Assumptions in program design Comments 
1. The relevant legislation on judicial 
organization is compliant with EU 
requirements 
2.1 Willingness of the NIM and TCC 
to assimilate the recommendations of   
the contractor partner 
2.2. Willingness to enforce alternative 
means of solving conflicts 
2.3. Full commitment of the parties 
involved 
2.4. NIM and TCC implemented the 
recommendations of the experts 
3.1. Successful implementation of 
other previous and ongoing related 
projects  
3.2. The training seminars are fully 
completed 
3.2. The CC network developed all 
the training activities. 
The formulation of assumptions is made exclu-
sively in favorable terms. 
 
Looking at the types of verbs and the manner in 
which the assumptions are formulated, the verb for 
Romanian institutions is passive in character (‘as-
similate’) versus the active stance of the EU side 
(e.g., ‘recommendation of the contractor’). This 
reflects an asymmetry of power, in which one part 
takes what is given, which is presumed to be best. 
 
Willingness and full commitment are the only pre-
conditions required from the Romanian part for 
achieving successful results.  
 
The expertise is given to be assimilated by the 
trainees in line with the recommendation of the 
contractor. The relevance of ‘expertise transfer’ is 
measured in ‘EU units of compliance’ without need 
to look into the ‘consumer needs’: what is relevant 
is simply what is compliant with EU norms. 
The narrative is simple: expertise from the EU contractors will be absorbed by 
the trainees, following the contractors’ recommendations. The assumptions are 
equivalent to this: the Romanian side will do as it is told. The willingness of the 
Romanian institutions (‘doer’) to implement (assimilate) what the EU (‘helper’) 
recommends is explicitly assumed. The relevance of the expertise transfer is 
presumed implicitly, with no need for specific examination of the situation of 
intended beneficiaries; what is relevant is what complies with the EU model. 
Possible unintended effects are not considered seriously. The context, the 
situation from where the Romanian-side doers start, is largely ignored. 
F. The absence of understanding of the specifics of the Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) 
sector. The sector of JHA requires a specific language and new approach, 
adequate to explore concepts such as ‘rule of law, good governance,  freedom’. 
Without such tools the managers of the reforms in the candidate countries 
struggled to conceptualise, implement and measure the impact of such elusive 
and multi-faceted themes (ECOTEC, 2006). No PCM manual existed to show 
how to conduct a risk assessment in this field. No general manual is adequate 
to the specific demands of the sector, and the methods in the EC’s PCM 
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Guidelines are less universal than they claim. In the 2004 Guidelines, for 
example, all the project examples come from health, industry, and 
environment; there is no reference to crosscutting sectors such as JHA and to 
their methodological requirements. A language to make better sense of the 
JHA sector is essential if plans and evaluations are not to turn into charades, in 
which fairy stories are told of how small deeds contribute to giant 
achievements. 
The Thematic PHARE Evaluation Report (ECOTEC, 2006) on support 
for transfer of the JHA Acquis to the twelve CCs during the Fifth Enlargement 
stresses repeatedly that adoption of legislation is far from enough: ‘the 
requirements… [for] adequate standards of administrative, judicial and 
executive policy and practice, are particularly extensive in this sector’ (Key 
Finding #1), but ‘have not been a significant or structured component of 
PHARE support’ (Conclusion #6). Yet despite this extra complexity, ‘no 
special guidance was provided’ (Key Finding #2), and the real impact of 
PHARE activities in the JHA sector is open to doubt (Key Finding #3 and 
Conclusion #6). Much activity was ad hoc and driven by pressure to disburse 
(Conclusion #3).  
Concluding, a project matrix is a simple conceptual tool useful as a starting 
point in ordering the priorities and tasks of project planners, but it fails in 
covering complex tasks involving many actors and operating with 
differentiated information at different levels of policy making. Its construction 
is limited by the assumption that reality can be captured through an algorithm 
easily readable by top managers and leaders, by just following the manual’s 
instructions. We have seen the 4x4 boxes of the matrix working in a restrictive 
way, encouraging a mechanical application of principles, and excluding serious 
thinking about alternative scenarios. The project matrix for these three key 
projects of justice reform provided instead a format for ritualistic validation of 
the pre-set objectives and standard activities.  
4.3 The implementation stage did not validate the 
assumptions – but they remained 
A key role of analysis during implementation should be to profile what was 
marginalized or excluded in the stage of design. We do this for component B 
in the program, in which the new National Institute for Magistrates (NIM) and 
the Training Centre for Court Clerks (TCC) benefited from assistance and 
Member State expertise from the Netherlands and France, during nineteen 
months in 2004-5. The findings are based on project descriptions and interim 
reports. The main project description during implementation is the ‘Project 
Covenant’, which is based on the successful bid made via a member state 
government to provide a detailed plan of how to implement the broad 
conception given in the program design that we just looked at. 
The goal of the project was to assist NIM and TCC in strategy 
development, curriculum development and training activities in 2004-2005. 
Almost every line of the project description uses the language of adjustment to 
EU models; EU requirements and EU legislation (see Table 3). Best practice 
here means EU practice. Results are presented as ‘guaranteed’, conveying not 
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just the sense that they have specified sources of backing – relevant activities 
have been planned – but that they are solemn commitments which will be 
achieved with near-certainty and whose non-achievement would be a matter of 
some shame. 
TABLE 3 
Project description: RO 02/IB/JH – 02  
‘ Further Assistance for the Development of NIM and TCC’ 
Goal:  to contribute to the Romanian programme for approximation to and harmonisation 
with European legislation. 
Objective: to assist the ‘National Institute for Magistrates’ (NIM), and the ‘Training Centre 
for Court Clerks’ (TCC) in strategy development, curriculum development and training 
activities’. 
Guaranteed results 
1. A National Strategy of NIM in-service-training in line with EU-requirements drafted and 
approved by the NIM.  
2. Improvements in the in-service training curricula of NIM effectuated and approved by 
the NIM.  
3. A system of trainers for in-service training of magistrates in line with EU-model set up 
and functioning. 
4. Training for up to 700 magistrates in both EC and national matters in line with EU-
standards delivered. 
5. Legal documentation on best practices, jurisprudence and relevant EU legislation for 
each training seminar designed. 
6. An institutional policy of TCC, guaranteeing autonomous functioning, drafted and ap-
proved by the TCC.  
7. A system of trainers for in-service training of auxiliary staff in line with EU-models set up 
and functioning. 
8. A national strategy of TCC for in-service training of auxiliary staff in line with EU-
requirements drafted and approved by TCC. 
9. Training for up to 420 auxiliary staff members in both EC and national legal matters in 
line with EU-standards delivered. 
Legal documentation on best practice, procedural techniques and legal provisions for 
training courses designed.     
Source: Project Covenant, p.3. 
The assessment of risk factors external to the project was formulated such as:  
Political, economic and natural factors. Although not likely, political changes 
resulting in changes in policy with regard to the judiciary might interfere with 
project implementation. Economic development resulting, e.g., in price increases 
could affect the financial viability of the project. Likewise, political or economic 
developments leading to strikes and other forms of public disorder could disrupt 
project. So could natural disasters (e.g. floods or severe winters). (p.29) 
The statements are commonplaces that fill the required boxes within a 
bureaucratic format. The severity of such risks in terms of degree of impact, 
and possible ways of mitigating the impact, were not discussed.  
The statements on risk factors internal to the project were similarly 
routine remarks such as could be made for any project (p.29; comment in 
italics is added): 
1. All partners are [i.e., must be but might not be] fully committed to the project.  
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2. Nevertheless, unforeseen non-availability of experts and/or trainees could 
reduce the quality of the program. 
3. A risk that needs closely monitoring by the project management is 
incompatibility of the expert interventions/contributions with the project’s goal 
and objectives. 
4. Timely signalling of internal and external factors threatening the 
implementation of the project and taking adequate counter-action will require 
close monitoring by the project management, the PAA in particular. 
5. …sufficient [CC] staff should be made available to begin and to continue the 
results after… 
The interim reports during program implementation declared that the 
objectives mentioned in the project design were fully achieved (‘validated’). 
That the objectives were ‘achieved’ was ‘proved’ by the number of sessions of 
training offered to clerks and magistrates following the new curriculum. Acquis 
transposition with respect to the Copenhagen Criteria was reduced to counting 
the number of magistrates trained and number of manuals written as tools for 
knowledge transfer in EU law matters. Thus, the transfer of knowledge 
became the only component considered with respect to achievement of the 
Copenhagen criteria. How this knowledge, if gained, is used and with what 
effect, was not assessed. 
Other evidence, including the Interim Evaluation Report for the field of 
Justice (ECOTEC 2005), indicates that some key assumptions were not 
fulfilled. Several of the foreseen internal risks became reality, and also some 
unforeseen ones. Although the institutional policy of the NSCC and a national 
strategy for in-service training of auxiliary staff were addressed, the domestic 
human and financial resources were not put in place and therefore the content 
of the policy could not yet be fulfilled (see also section 5.4 below, on 
sustainability of the project). In general, insufficient Romanian staff was 
available or recruited to meet the long list of objectives that we saw in Table 3. 
Similarly, the local institutional capacity (as something going beyond just 
institutional commitment or appointments of staff) to absorb the expertise and 
its impacts was limiting, but not recognised as a problem in any stage of the 
project. The logic of the principle that ‘best results will be reached given the 
best conditions’ was clearly insufficient. 
The assumption of ‘willingness of the NIM and TCC to assimilate the 
recommendations of the contractor partner’ was also refuted. Local 
organizations had their own recommendations. As noted in the Interim 
Evaluation Report, the cooperation had ‘initial problems, including the need to 
change both project leaders [from the Member State and from Romania], 
changes in the management of NIM and delays in starting activities’ 
(ECOTEC 2005: 9). In the end, the PAA also withdrew early. Thus all the 
leading figures were replaced. This failure of the ideal model of cooperation 
seems to have been viewed as bad luck rather than as reflecting any systemic 
flaw in the model, and so did not bring in the evaluation report any analysis of 
the dynamics of the interaction or recommendations for future projects. The 
‘transfer of expertise’ from MS to CC countries continued under the same 
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scheme, by just replacing the actors. While ad hoc adjustments were made, the 
non-confirmed assumptions were not revised.13 The problems of clashing 
expertise or inappropriateness of the model transfer to Romanian institutions 
remained out of the field of vision of the project evaluators and designers. 
Thus assumptions exist that, whoever the EU experts are, a consensus will be 
reached between them on what ‘the EU model’ means, as well of course that 
the model – whatever it is – will work. The problem of leadership in a multi-
cultural space, and issues of the social, political and cultural profile of the 
actors and their personal values, remains neglected dimensions of design. In 
sum, the EC scheme of design and monitoring reflected a philosophy of a 
presumed value-free system, conceived apart from any ‘cultural, psychological 
and linguistic context’ (Fischer, 1995:11), and was marked in practice by rituals 
of validation. 
5 Reading the EC’s 2005 interim evaluation for the 
Romanian field of  Justice 
Analysis of the frames and argumentation used by external evaluators hired by 
the EC helps us to better understand both the projects and programs in the 
justice field, and the problems in the Commission’s strategy and methods. The 
Interim Evaluation Report for the Romanian field of Justice (ECOTEC 2005) 
serves us as a source of secondary data analysis and as itself an object of 
analysis. 
Guidelines and supervision for evaluation are given by the Evaluation Unit 
in the Commission’s Directorate-General for Enlargement. Following the 
Commission’s Project Cycle Management manuals, five broad evaluation 
criteria are used, related to different stages of the policy cycle: relevance, 
efficiency, effectiveness, impact and sustainability.  
 The relevance of the project is defined as related ‘primarily to its design and 
concerns the extent to which its stated objectives correctly address the 
identified problems or real needs’ (PHARE I.E. Guide, 2004:13).  
 The efficiency criterion is defined as ‘how well the various activities 
transformed the available resources into the intended results (sometimes 
referred to as outputs), in terms of quantity, quality and timeliness. A key 
question it asks is ‘have things been done right?’ and thereby also 
addresses value-for-money, that is whether similar results could have been 
achieved more by other means at lower cost in the same time’ (PHARE 
I.E. Guide, 2004:13) 
 The effectiveness criterion, in the Log Frame terminology, concerns how far 
the project’s results were used or their potential benefits were realised - in 
                                                 
13 In another project the clash of expertise between experts from different Member 
States was such that one MS was assigned to work exclusively on the institutional 
infrastructure and the other exclusively on capacity building or expertise transfer. The 
lack of coordination between them showed an inappropriate institutional mechanism 
in relation to the expertise received or their inappropriate expertise in relation to the 
organisational design. 
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other words, whether they achieved the project purpose. The key question 
is what difference the project made, as measured by how far the intended 
beneficiaries really benefited from the products or services it made 
available. (PHARE I.E. Guide, 2004:13) 
 The term impact, referred to also as outcome, denotes the relationship 
between the project’s purpose and overall objectives, that is the extent to 
which the benefits received by the target beneficiaries had a wider overall 
effect on larger numbers of people in the sector or region or in the 
country as a whole (PHARE I.E. .Guide, 2004:13). 
 Sustainability relates to whether the positive outcomes of the project at 
purpose level are likely to continue after external funding ends, and also 
whether it’s longer-term impact on the wider development process can be 
sustained at the level of the sector, region or country. (PHARE I.E. 
Guide, 2004:13) 
Diagram 1 shows how these criteria, listed in the left hand column, are meant 
to correspond to particular links between the levels in the hierarchy of project 
objectives. 
Diagram 1 
The PHARE Interim Evaluation Scheme 
(PHARE Interim Evaluation Guide, 2004:12) 
 
An ‘in-depth’ evaluation, covering in total 15 programs within the JHA 
chapter, was conducted from November 2004 to January 2005 by ECOTEC, 
an independent body hired by the EC to study progress of the EU Pre-
accession Instrument for Romania. The report made overall recommendations 
WIDER OBJECTIVES 
Overall lasting change, both at the level of the 
project/programme and beyond it 
IMMEDIATE OBJECTIVES 
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RESULTS 
Confirmed planned deliverables 
ACTIVITIES 
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MEANS (Inputs) 
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DESIGN & PREPARATION 
Impact & Sustainability link
(rests even more on wider risks, 
assumptions and conditions, many 
outside direct control) 
 Effectiveness link 
(depends on risks, assumptions and any 
conditions that apply, sometimes 
beyond control) 
Efficiency links (from means 
through activities to results; look also at 
any assumptions and conditions that 
apply; sometimes beyond direct control)
Relevance to the identified  
problems or the real need that is to be 
addressed 
Evaluation levels Log frame levels 
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for the JHA chapter and specific recommendations for each of its seven 
sectors, one of them being the field of Justice. The cluster or fiche of projects 
that we discussed in section 4 above was the sample taken for evaluation in this 
field.  
Component C of the cluster is, without explanation, barely mentioned in 
the report. As a ‘Twinning Light [Lite]’ it had no MS expert continuously 
present, only a few consultancy missions. Within component B, the National 
School for Court Clerks is also barely mentioned. Consequently, two 
institutions from the three are examined in the report: NIM and SCM. 
Sometimes these two Twinning projects are discussed separately but 
sometimes jointly, despite being both important, and distinct and diverse in 
character, activities and performance. 
The components were assessed according to the five criteria of 
performance mentioned in Diagram 1. The technique used was score rating: 
the program performance was rated by individual evaluators on a scale from 
Highly Unsatisfactory (-2) to Highly Satisfactory (+2) for each aspect; the final 
grade was the average score on the various aspects. The evaluation was thus 
reduced to a numerical indicator lacking any force of expression and 
argumentation in relation with the (thin) narrative that was provided. 
Evaluation of a project should ideally ‘[contribute] to the clarification and 
critique of the values driving the policy or [establish] a basis for restructuring 
the problem.’ (Dunn, 2004:58). It should at least offer more than a recording 
of supposedly achieved results on such a primitive scale, which can become a 
substitute for the reality under evaluation. 
The evaluation of progress in the JHA chapter and the recommendations 
made for improvement are given in Annex 2. For the field of Justice, the 
evaluation presented the following findings. 
5.1 Relevance – for whom and for what? 
The relevance of the program was discussed with reference to the political 
criteria in the Copenhagen Treaty: ‘the independence and integrity of the 
courts for the functioning of a democratic society’. The indicated tool in 
achieving the mentioned goal is ‘the road maps drawn by EU […] developing 
and implementing an up-dated and integrated Action Plan and Strategy for the 
reform of the judiciary in Romania’ (ECOTEC, 2005:9). Given that all the 
political requirements are integrally related to the objectives of the program, its 
relevance should be high. Yet the score given for relevance was only 
‘satisfactory’. Why? 
A possible explanation is that in the design stage the discussion of 
relevance didn’t ask ‘relevant for whom?’. The meaning of ‘relevance’ at the 
project design stage referred to the political conditions given from outside and 
linked to a pure conceptual framework and normative statements: the 
Copenhagen criteria translated into a plan of action without any testing of how 
they could anchor in the reality of Romanian society and the Romanian justice 
sector. As we saw, arising from the overall political agenda and the design 
method, there was lack of close attention to that reality in the design stage. 
This could lead to doubts about relevance during the evaluation stage, where as 
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we saw relevance is defined by the extent to which the projects ‘correctly 
address the identified problems or real needs’ (PHARE IE Guide, 2004:13, 
emphasis added). The report’s language in evaluating the relevance of the 
project is itself, to use the EU category, barely satisfactory, and reflects the 
conflicting perspectives of formulation stage and implementation stage and the 
limitations of the evaluation tool, which checks only on intended effects. But 
based on the score given, one might infer that the justice sector projects may 
not have identified the ‘real needs’ well. What was thought of as relevant in the 
head office by officials could be found to face major constraints in the field. 
Assumptions and alternative means were not thought through, and in any case 
issues cannot be totally anticipated as the methodology pretends to do. The 
projects fulfilled the standard criteria in the stage of design but failed in 
fulfilling the criteria required by empirical test.  
5.2 Efficiency – in terms of whose objectives? Helper-Doer 
Relations 
The efficiency of the projects was evaluated for Twinning components A and 
B together and given an overall score of 0, ‘barely satisfactory’. For 
Component A (Supreme Council of Magistrates) the significant questionable 
aspect was ‘the independence of the judiciary, and its inevitable impacts on 
project outputs’. The evaluation of Component B of the program (support to 
the National Institute of Magistrates) is familiar to us from section 4.3, and 
deserves closer attention. Comments are added within square brackets. 
‘Though facing initial problems, including the need to change both project 
leaders, changes in the management of NIM and delays in starting activities, 
twinning support to NIM and NSCC is currently progressing well.’  
‘However, activities [specified in the Covenant] have had to be adapted [to 
beneficiaries’ felt needs!] since NIM developed its own strategy [‘local 
ownership’!], without consultation with the PAA [pre-accession adviser provided 
by the Commission / Member State]. This strategy has subsequently been 
adopted and twinning support is limited to developing a road map for its 
implementation, although the covenant envisaged a more significant MS 
[member state] input. …’  (ECOTEC, 2005:9; italicised comments added). 
The efficiency of a project cannot be guaranteed by a simple transfer of 
instruments and ready-made strategy. The phase of project design had ignored 
the question of the readiness of the Romanian institutions and their possible 
resistance to the external conditionality. Program performance was then 
affected by the reactions of the local institutions to the ready-made strategy of 
the EC that was proclaimed without serious prior consultations. Reading 
beyond the lines, the activities in the implementation phase for NIM ignored 
the authority of the EC-provided adviser and the strategy fixed by the ‘road 
maps’ (ECOTEC, 2005; 4.2.2). It appears that, in contrast to training activities, 
which were fully accepted, for the field of institution building the involvement 
of an EU member state was perceived by the Romanian partner as not 
essential and even as inappropriate. Without waiting for the delayed Twinning 
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project, NIM went ahead to prepare its own strategy, as required by its 
domestic obligations. 
NIM is an important institution with a revised mission and a major role in 
educating new generations of magistrates. Its importance for Romania requires 
more than just the formation of the organization; it must have adequate intra-
national transparency and accountability. Flowing as they did out of stages of 
strategizing and programming by EU agencies, the project design and 
Covenant included accountability to external agents – MS experts and a Pre-
Accession Adviser who had arrived with the agreements that were signed with 
the Romanian side, a supply of prescriptions, and maybe with perceived 
coercive powers. But the Romanian side assumed its own sovereignty. An 
institution like NIM has its own domestic accountability and legitimacy, 
including to and through its Council (CSM), links to which it gave priority over 
external agents and their claims. To move forward requires that a Member 
State external ‘helper’ interpret any ‘road map’ not as a ‘route map’, a fixed 
series of activities, but as an overview of a space within which drivers must 
proceed by paying attention to where they are and what they encounter in 
reality: including even the unanticipated phenomenon of ‘doer’ autonomy. In 
David Ellerman’s terms, an adjustment of help according to what ‘doer’ needs 
are – as seen through ‘doer’ eyes – is essential in order to genuinely build 
capacity. The Thematic PHARE Evaluation Report (ECOTEC, 2006) review 
of a decade of JHA sector preparation for the Fifth Enlargement concludes 
that ‘candidate countries should first define their own national strategies’, with 
PHARE support and as a precondition for any project design work 
(Recommendation #4). But freedom to the CC to tailor its strategy is in 
tension with the imperative to align with the EU model. Given the pre-
established rules the external adviser too does not have much official room to 
manoeuvre; yet sticking strictly to those prior formal rules is unlikely to 
succeed. He risks to be seen as an ‘iron hand’ who tries to impose an 
organizational strategy by enforcing the letter of a Covenant, ignoring the 
institutional context and constraints of the partner (including also the partner’s 
other commitments and the lines of accountability implied by other externally 
supported projects). How to prioritise the multiple claims and find an 
appropriate intervention becomes a political bargain that requires attention to 
the content, the context and the process of change. The theme of multiple 
accountability of Romanian institutions and their reaction to unrecognised and 
un-legitimated external power would ideally be a theme of reflection for the 
EU and its consultants during an ‘in depth evaluation’ – at least if the role of 
the evaluation includes to identify inconsistencies between method and 
practice and not simply re-endorse a fixed model of ‘best practices’. 
The notion of ‘road map’ appears to function as a sense-making term for 
EU and MS experts. It makes a claim for authority, and its apparent precision 
offers reassurance within the fog and ambiguity of accession practice. As with 
other composite terms, piling-up of components that denote purpose (‘road’) 
and expertise (‘map’) can be a substitute for real control and real action. At 
each stage the Commission and its agents announce ‘road maps’, but they bear 
no inevitable close connection to plans or actions in the next stage. Those arise 
out of the interaction (and mutual avoidance) of numerous agents, from 
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various member-states and from the candidate country, which has its own 
maps. Vague general intentions of reform, such as existed before NIM worked 
out its strategy, are not real route maps. The new roads on the Romanian map 
of justice got drawn partly ad-hoc. 
5.3 Effectiveness 
The effectiveness of the projects was ranked by the evaluators as ‘satisfactory’. 
The evaluation text is fragmented and uses stereotypical vague bland language: 
‘twinning activities aimed at assisting both institutions’ [NIM and SCM], 
‘assistance is being provided to both institutions’ ‘training are contributing 
effectively in all areas [sic; with the exception of strategy development for 
NIM] … the capacity of  both institutions to deliver in-service training is being 
significantly enhanced […] training manuals are being prepared […] pools of 
trainers are being created’ (ECOTEC, 2005:10; italics added). The delivery of 
project activities here takes the place of fulfilment of the guaranteed results. 
The PHARE IE Guide offers nuanced suggestions to guide the 
assessment of effectiveness in project implementation, for example (2004: 37): 
‘whether behavioural patterns have changed in the beneficiary organizations 
and how far they have planned improvements; if the assumptions and risk 
assessments at results level turned out to be inadequate or invalid or 
unforeseen factors intervened’;  and so on. None of these guidelines are 
followed in the evaluation. The discussion is shaped purely around giving 
scores and doesn’t offer any nuanced argumentation with respect to sensitive 
topics such as: why people consider the capacity of the institutions to deliver 
in-service training is ‘significantly enhanced’, or why the training is contributing 
less effectively in the field of the strategy development (see above), and so on. 
The study remains at a superficial level, without reflection on and 
interpretation of the data. What was designed to be the strength of the method 
– an exhaustively long list of indicators – is reduced to a ‘satisfactory’ score 
(+1), a token without much meaning. 
5.4 Impact and Sustainability 
Evaluation of project impact and sustainability must attend to the transition 
from the limited life of a project – in which the transformation of the state 
institutions can stop when the project is finished – to a phase when the project 
gets ‘melted’ into the wider societal context and  serves, it is hoped, as a tool in 
ongoing transformation. Such evaluation must pay attention to ‘wider risks, 
assumptions and conditions, many outside of direct control’ (PHARE Interim 
Evalation Guide: 2004:12). One success indicator is for the project to gain 
ownership from the context. Knowing and understanding the ‘language’ of the 
place, accessing tacit knowledge, is key to an appropriate intervention, rather 
than a pre-determined model that tries to force the reality to fit into it. The life 
of the institutions – mentalities, values, beliefs – cannot be planned and 
strategically fitted into a ready-made model. The personalities of the actors, 
their behavioural patterns and the context they belong to cannot be ignored or 
standardized. 
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(A) The impact of both projects was assessed by the evaluators in terms such 
as ‘should be, in principle, positive and significant’, based on the ‘intended purpose to 
contribute to the Romanian programs for approximation to and harmonization 
with European legislation’ (ECOTEC, 2005:10; emphases added). The 
evaluators use verbs in the continuous form, to emphasise that project activity 
is ongoing. Validation of project impact is then made by reference to the good 
intentions (intended purposes) of the projects. The rhetorical usage of language 
that we saw in the design stage (‘the best results will be obtained under the best 
conditions’) is paralleled by these references to approved intentions and 
approved activities.  
A ‘however’ introduces a new line of argumentation. An Action Plan and 
Strategy has been created with ‘significant support from this programme’. How 
little supported this strategy is becomes clear from the warning letters used for 
the score of ‘barely satisfactory’, given due to the absence of adequate 
documentation from the Romanian Government on how to proceed with the 
realisation of the Plan. The gaps mainly concern provision of financial and 
human resources. 
‘However assessment of impact MUST take serious account also of progress in 
the preparation and implementation of a comprehensive strategy for the reform 
of the judiciary, and its associated development as a separate and independent 
power of the state. An action Plan and Strategy for the reform of the Judiciary 
has been created, with significant support from this programme.  However, 
doubts remain with respect to the availability of adequate financial and human 
resources for their implementation and this has a significant effect on impact. 
GoR is required to submit to the EU by March 2005 further documentation to 
support the realization of the Action Plan and Strategy. At this point in time, and 
in the absence of such documentation, impact is rated as ‘barely satisfactory’.’ 
(I.E R/Ro/JHA/0411/2005:10; emphasis in the original). 
(B) The score for sustainability of the projects is ‘barely satisfactory’ (0). 
‘…there is significant doubt whether these initiatives will be sustained in the 
absence of external support. Twinning support to SCM is working hard to ensure 
greater independence of the judiciary from both internal and external 
interference, but its realization is far from secured. The continuous operation of 
inspector judges, with a direct involvement in the work of their colleagues, raises 
fundamental questions with respect to independence.  
Similarly, both, in NIM and NSSC, it is unlikely that sufficient funds will be made 
available to maintain in-service training of magistrates and court clerks at 
necessary levels after twinning support is completed’ (ECOTEC, 2005:10). 
Concluding, the EC policy evaluation of the projects cluster appears the 
product of a limited approach and rigid conceptual tools, operating with 
distorted and limited information. It was torn between an evident reality of 
change that was both troubled and in different directions—perhaps more 
locally relevant and certainly more locally ‘owned’—than those planned. 
Superficial attention to unintended effects, and treatment of partial indicators 
as perfect measures of all facets of an objective, can be seen as negative effects 
of the tools used. They reduce the usefulness of the evaluation as a response to 
the problems that it mentions. 
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Only if the purpose is simply to confirm Romanian acceptance of the 
hegemony of EU norms and procedures could this form of evaluation suffice. 
The impact of projects addressed to the Romanian justice sector should, 
ideally, be measured in a more meaningful way than by number of Courts of 
Appeal built or number of judges trained. The content of the transformation 
should eventually require attention to subsequent processes: e.g., whether 
magistrates’ behaviour is changing in relations with their ‘clients’, or how their 
communications skills have developed. Who can say something about this are 
the intended beneficiaries of a reform; and these are neither the Ministry of 
Justice nor the Program Implementation Unit. Ordinary people should give the 
real measure of the reform. 
6 Conclusions: Carrots, sticks, sermons – and dialogue? 
The preparation and use of statements and systems of policy is an attempt to 
build and exercise authority, including through demonstration of expertise, and 
to build order, including through the institutionalization of sets of accepted 
ideas and values (Colebatch 1998). Even if the ideas and values are far from 
always followed in practice, they may become absorbed as being considered 
appropriate, and can reinforce the pre-eminence of those who promote them. 
 
A delicate task 
How can we interpret the policy story of Romania’s accession to the EU? One 
can ask different questions. The simplest is: Did Romania deserve to enter the 
EU in terms of the specified criteria? Many commentators say, no (see e.g. 
Freyberg & Holman 2005). But no country can transform overnight, instantly 
create new institutions, new cadres of people with new skills, new attitudes and 
new networks, all immediately available to work devotedly at local salaries to 
perform tasks which hard-to-find and vastly more rewarded EU consultants 
temporarily fill or propose. Italy remains deficient in terms of various formal 
EU criteria after fifty years of membership. So, a subtler set of questions 
emerges: How could the EU leadership try to assure that 1. Romania made 
sufficient progress in terms of the formal criteria in order to be able to 2. 
Ensure in effect the hegemony of EU ideas over Romania, and 3. Sufficiently 
plausibly state that Romania would make future progress, and thus 4. Keep 
critical EU publics sufficiently happy and 5. Admit and ‘capture’ Romania even 
though it had, inevitably, failed in certain ways to fulfil the full formal set of 
criteria, and could never fulfil them in just a few years? And we can specifically 
ask: How did the various formalities of method and procedure contribute to 
this process? 
The EU procedures for Romania accession shared grosso modo the 
features adopted for the previous entrants, including a strategy of 
conditionality and a general managerialist style. At the same time, this accession 
had marked particularities. The measures used and the new mechanism for 
cooperation and verification of progress were demonstrative public tools 
thought of only for Romania and Bulgaria, in order to cover inconsistencies 
between the EU policy’s objectives and its established methods. Those 
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methods were panoply of technical apparatuses to assess progress in terms of 
numerous complex criteria; yet the prime underlying policy objective was 
simple, to absorb these former Communist European states within a few years. 
How could this be done in a manner defensible to electorates of the existing 
member states?  
 
Phase I: The EU sets the goal and defines the route to supposedly assure its achievement 
The European Commission’s favourite method of planning and evaluation for 
dealing with external clients has been the logical framework approach. Its 
typical usage is based on a top-down approach and technocratic conceptions of 
organizations, objectives and development (Gasper, 2000b). Such an approach 
matches a certain political context or perspective, of strong vertical hierarchy 
or of attempts to build that. EU policy formulation for handling Romania’s 
possible accession was in this top-down, technocratic mode, and 
correspondingly it employed a planning methodology centred on the logical-
framework approach. This provides a very limited format, especially in 
standard usage. While the PCM manual says one should include an alternatives 
analysis, for example, that typically does not happen. 
The new mechanisms created show that EU accession policy, like most 
EU development policy, follows an instrumental approach: the EU sets fixed 
universal goals and devises a country-specific road-map to reach those goals 
through application of various instruments, incentives and penalties. Instead of 
paying close attention to understanding the current situation of the prospective 
doer that is supposed to carry out reforms – here, Romania – and instead of 
correspondingly later assessing the case for Enlargement according to what 
Romania had achieved in an autonomous way, the European Commission 
centred its discourse around the supposed power of its own mechanisms: its 
existing model of European behaviour, which was to be transposed via 
application of existing standard EU management processes. This discourse 
overestimates the role of the ‘external incentive’, the ‘carrots’, the prize of EU 
membership and the associated funding arrangements, and the strength of the 
mechanisms of verification and control. In the Commission’s discourse, 
Romania’s progress is attributed solely to the ‘power of external coercive, 
remunerative and persuasive measures’ (Etzioni, 1998: 29). The results 
achieved by Romania are presented by the EC as purely consequences of the 
European mechanism of conditionality; and the discourse uses biased 
information to induce a belief that the progress will surely continue and 
Romania will achieve the standard required, via a best-practice mechanism of 
control and verification. 
 
Phase II: Implementation -- a technocratic conception of programmes and projects 
A key lacuna in the EC’s policy approach concerns the dimension of resistance 
by local actors to the conditionality of the elements of the policy transfer. The 
EU approach uses the oversimplified assumption that a consensus can be 
reached between stakeholders without prior assessment of and specific attention 
paid to the societal and political context to which they belong and their 
different and sometimes conflicting interests and experience. This reflects the 
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influence of a managerialist approach operating with an assumption of a single 
‘rational actor’ who can formulate ‘a rational–comprehensive position, 
[through examination of] a well defined problem, full baseline information, 
fully adequate time and no resource constraints’ (Forester, 1989:50). The 
assumption brings low respect for the autonomy of the doer. When faced with 
the contradictions that arise, the EC justifies continuing the process under the 
assumption of the willingness of the actors to cooperate and assimilate the EU 
model (Table 2 above). The EC needs to grasp that the member states and the 
candidate countries are two polar sides of a policy transfer who enter into 
dialogue—or bargaining—from different positions and with ‘different senses 
of valuations of the problem’, so that information ‘becomes a political 
resource, contested, withheld, manipulated and distorted’ (Forester, 1989:56). 
 
Phase III: The time for decision -- ‘Future improvement is assured’ 
Romania’s accession process was not a systematic, thorough and ingenious 
ensuring of fulfilment of the stated necessary conditions. For example, the 
EU’s methods lose in force once accession procedures are far advanced, for it 
becomes enormously difficult to declare failure. But nor could we describe 
them as purely a ritual of validation, in the sense of having no impact and yet 
having only one possible political outcome (accession) regardless of what was 
done and produced within the process. The process brought major pressures 
and resources to bear on important structures and practices within Romania, 
and initiated significant changes. We have talked however of rituals of 
validation because, firstly, the process and methods were in various ways 
counterproductive to achievement both of the declared immediate objectives 
(for the approach often alienates ‘the helped’) and the declared fundamental 
objectives, for the approach fails sufficiently to use local knowledge and 
mobilise local energy. Secondly, much of the approach exists primarily of 
claims on paper, the filling in of boxes and reports, through from design stage 
(‘Assumptions: all the conditions that are required for the pre-specified 
objectives to be attained’) to report stage (‘100 judges were trained’) to the 
evaluation stage’s ‘barely satisfactory’, the euphemism for ‘unsatisfactory but 
tolerated’.  
Given the limited power of the tools of inducement and evaluation, the 
technical verification of the results (in monitoring reports) was replaced in the 
decision-making stage by an openly rhetorical discourse, with regard to 
Romanian readiness for accession. The gulf between the EC’s political rhetoric 
and its methods for program and project intervention is visible when one tries 
to make the link between the results of the monitoring reports and the 
moment in 2005 when the EC presented its reasoning in favour of Romanian 
accession in front of the European Parliament. Not finding sufficient 
assurance in the state of the reforms already on the ground, the proposal that 
Romania was ready for accession was held together by the declared beliefs that 
the mechanisms of cooperation and verification are technically solid and that 
Romania is ‘on track’, a track of continuing improvement. 
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Phase IV: The sting in the tale – and the real work that lies ahead 
The decline in the EU’s power to induce change may increase further once 
countries are fully admitted. A February 2008 report from the Commission 
found that: ‘“Procedural errors” had blocked criminal probes [in Romania] into 
corruption by serving or former ministers. Romania’s parliament had made 
significant changes to a criminal-investigation law, including a demand that 
suspects be informed in advance if their telephone was going to be tapped, and 
the downgrading of embezzlement worth less than E9m to a “minor” offence. 
… [T]he justice minister, Monica Macovei (revered in Brussels as the country’s 
most effective sleaze-buster), was sacked three months after EU entry, accused 
by her prime minister of failing to uphold “government solidarity”.’ (The 
Economist, 2008: 14). The Economist argues nevertheless that delay would not 
have helped: ‘A whole generation of corrupt old judges will have to leave office 
before things change, says an EU official’ (p.15), and arguably in that transition 
period reformers are helped and more influence is exerted by having Romania 
inside rather than outside the Union. 
Real improvement requires attention to locally relevant and locally 
grounded innovation, going beyond a centrally enforced technocratic blueprint 
to a more adequate conception about organizations and institutions. 
Innovation must not be seen as concentrated in one (‘helper’) pair of hands 
(Ellerman, 2005). The sharing of knowledge is more relevant than the pre-
announced transfer of ready made models should be the first step toward a 
more realistic practice of reform. Second, within such sharing the horizontal 
diffusion of innovation, amongst and between recently acceded countries and 
countries in accession will often be more relevant than appointment of experts 
from very different countries. Third, in all cases, re-invention of the innovation 
as it is adopted and implemented by local units is important. Interpretative 
policy analysis makes us aware that ‘meanings and actions are actively 
constructed in social context through relational dynamics’ (Healey et al., 2003: 
64). Therefore, an authentic transformation and an authentic dialogue demand 
careful attention both to the ‘process by which meanings are disseminated’ and 
to the intrinsic value of local knowledge as ‘resources of the transformation’ 
(ibid). The EU non-negotiability of both the content and the means of its 
strategy had as side-effect the incapacity or limited capacity of the Romanian 
institutions to ‘absorb’ the model of practice and to achieve the intended 
results in building their other capacities. 
Romania’s ‘reconstruction in line with the EU model’ must therefore 
mean more than Romania adopting ‘European values’. Besides the vague 
character of the values definition and the question of whose values, Romania 
has something to preserve as its own identity and something to offer to 
Europe, in culture, values, and practices. Instead, everything Romania reads 
from the EU’s method and discourse is presented in terms of ‘what Romania 
must do’, ‘in line with EU requirements’. The current Commission discourse 
consists of publicizing EU asserted success and Romania’s continued 
deficiencies. Romanians do not know why they have been accepted by Europe 
if they have so many sins. As shown by Freyberg and Holman, overambitious 
and over-rigid goals and deadlines in institutional reform projects lead to much 
embarrassment and unfortunate side-effects. This situation arises in the 
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absence of an authentic dialogue, and where the channels of real 
communication function in one direction only. 
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Appendices 
Annex 1 
 ‘Logical framework’/ planning matrix for PHARE RO/2002/000-5860416 
Project Fiche ‘Assistance in strengthening the independence and functioning of the Romanian Judiciary system’14 
 
OVERALL OBJECTIVE Objective verifiable indicators Sources of verification Assumptions 
Contribution to the improvement of the operation of the Romanian 
judicial system 
The Romanian judicial system 
modernised and in line with the EU 
requirements in the areas addressed 
by this project 
Reports and statistics; EC 
 
Commission& MoJ; annual 
 
PROJECT PURPOSE Objectively verifiable indicators Sources of Verification Assumptions 
Component A:  
Institutional capacity and functioning of SCM enhanced in line with 
EU requirements; 
Component B: 
Further development of NIM and TCC 
Component C: 
Creating and strengthening conflict analysis and resolution 
capacities by introducing alternatives means to the judiciary in 
solving civil and commercial cases. 
Judges will have the basic knowledge in EC Law, and also will be 
updated with the new national legislation and TCC will be 
strengthened and fully functional 
 
- By 2005 the SCM will be 
strengthened in line with EU 
requirements 
- By 2005, approx. 2000 Romanians 
also will be updated with the new 
national legislation and TCC will be 
strengthened and fully functional 
- By 2005, alternative means will be 
better enforced 
 
 
- Regular reports of the 
Commission 
 
- Governmental report annual 
 
 
-  Evaluation of the improvement 
of the activity in courts; 
- statistics 
-  biannual 
 
 
 
RESULTS Objectively verifiable measures Sources of Verification Assumptions 
Component A: 
Institutional capacity and functioning of SCM 
enhanced in line with EU requirements: 
  
Result 1 – Legal framework of the SCM status improved 
Result 2 – Organizational structure plan of SCM set up 
- SCM recognized as a representative 
and decision maker of magistrates 
- The organizational structure well 
designed 
- The secondary legislation on 
functioning of the SCM 
- Legislation, reports; intern and 
international bodies; bi-annual 
- Legislation Statistics; MoJ and 
SCM; annual 
- Reports; the EC experts/; 
quarterly 
- Full commitment of the parties 
involved. 
- The recommendations of the 
EU partners are assimilated 
 
                                                 
14 The project file combines the designs for 3 possible projects (phase I) submitted to the EC. After approval, the project file becomes a public document – and can be found 
published on the internet under the web  page of European Commission, Enlargement-  ec.europa.eu/enlargement/fiche_projet/document. 
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Result 3 - Secondary legislation relating to the functioning of 
SCM– drafted; 
Result 4 – Action Plan to monitor the enforcement of the 
Deontological Code of Magistrates set up 
- Action plan for Deontological Code 
designed 
 
-  Statistics; reports Government; 
Commission; annual 
Component B: 
Further development of NIM and TCC 
 
Result 1 – A National Strategy of NIM in-service training in line 
with EU requirements - drafted 
Result 2 –  In service training curricula of NIM improved 
Result 3. –  The system of trainers for in-service training of 
magistrates set up in line with EU models; 
Result 4. –  Training for magistrates in both EC and national legal 
matters delivered in line with EU standards 
Result 5– Legal documentation on best practices, jurisprudence 
and relevant EU legislation designed for each training seminar 
Result 6 –  Institutional policy of TCC developed to guarantee 
autonomous functioning 
Result 7 –  The system of trainers for in-service training of 
auxiliary staff set up in line with EU models; 
Result 8 –  A National Strategy of TCC for in-service training of 
auxiliary staff in line with EU requirements – drafted 
Result 9 –  Training for auxiliarry staff in both EC and national 
legal matters delivered to be delivered in line with EU standards 
Result 10– Legal documentation on best practice, procedural 
techniques and legal provisions designed for in training course 
 
- Strategy on in-service training 
designed and enforced 
- Curricula adjusted 
- The network of trainers operational 
- By 2005, magistrates trained in EC 
Law 
- Support documentation used during 
and after delivering training 
seminars 
- Legal and institutional framework of 
TCC enacted 
- The network of trainers operational 
- Strategy on in service training 
designed and enforced 
- Clerks trained 
- Support documentation used during 
and after delivering training 
seminars 
- Assessment of existing legislation  
completed 
- Study on alternative means in EU 
country elaborated 
- Proposal for a draft law designed & 
approved 
- Evaluation Forms and proposals of 
participants to the debates 
- Reports 
- EU experts NIM and TCC  
- Annual, quarterly Reports 
- EU experts, MoJ 
 
- The training seminars are fully 
completed 
- The CC network developed all 
the training activities 
- NIM and TCC implemented 
the recommendations of the 
experts 
- Full commitment of the   
parties involved. 
- Willingness to assimilate new 
concept [that is] not enough 
prior tested in Romania 
 
 
Component C:  
Creating and strengthening conflict analysis and resolution capacities by introducing alter-
natives means to the judiciary in solving civil and commercial cases 
 
Result 1– Recommendation of improving the existing legal framework on alternatives 
means to the judiciary in solving civil and commercial cases drafted in line with EU re-
quirements 
Result 2 –   Best practice manual stressing on the features and advantages of mediation in 
civil, family and commercial disputes drafted 
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Result 3– Proposal for a draft law on mediation 
Results 4– Awareness of large segments of beneficiaries (magistrates, lawyers, civil soci-
ety, students) of the concept and advantages of using alternative means in solving civil, 
family and commercial cases 
ACTIVITIES MEANS  ASSUMPTIONS 
Component A:  
Institutional capacity and functioning of SCM enhanced in line with EU requirements: 
Result 1 –  Legal framework of the SCM status improved 
A1. - to asses the legal framework and the amending proposals related to increasing the 
SCM’ competencies 
Result 2 – Organizational structure plan of SCM set up 
A2. - to design and monitor proposals related for a new organizational structure, institu-
tional capacity and functioning of SCM 
Result 3 - Secondary legislation relating to the functioning of SCM– drafted: 
A3. - to elaborate proposals for the secondary legislation related to the competencies and 
the functioning of the SCM 
Result 4 – Action Plan to monitor the enforcement of the Deontological Code of Magis-
trates set up 
A4. - to design an action plan aiming to monitor the proper enforcement of the Deontologi-
cal Code of Magistrates and to identify specific remedies in monitoring process 
A1 TWINNING 
A2 TWINNING  
A3 TWINNING LIGHT 
 
Component B: Further development of NIM and TCC 
Result 1– A National Strategy of NIM in-service training in line with EU requirements – 
drafted 
A1. to design a National Strategy of the in - service training for magistrates following the 
principle of train the trainers and the recommendation for such strategy initiated in the 
framework of Phare Horizontal 1999 “Building Capacity for Training of Judges in EC Law” 
in the middle 2002 year. 
Result 2 – In service training curricula of NIM improved 
A2. - to improve the design of the in service training curricula of NIM following the direction 
of the above National Strategy 
Result 3. – The system of trainers for in-service training of magistrates set up in line with 
EU models 
A3. -  to strengthen the existing 24 EC trainers network by adding the 5 magistrates 
trained under Helsinki Committee programme, NIM specialized training staff and judges 
from the other courts in the country and by creating specialized trainers in other fields of 
law 
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Result 4 –  Training for magistrates in both EC and national legal matters delivered in line 
with EU standards 
A4. - to organize training courses mainly for the sitting magistrates involving both EU and 
national trainers. The training seminars will offer both the EC and the national perspective 
of the subject matter.15 
Result 5 - Legal documentation on best practices, jurisprudence and relevant EU 
legislation designed for each training seminar 
A5. - to design and distribute practical manuals as tools to be used for each topic debated 
during training courses 
Result 6 –  Institutional policy of TCC developed to guarantee autonomous functioning 
A6. to assess and make recommendation of the institutional capacity and functioning of 
TCC in line with EU standards 
Result 7 –  The system of trainers for in-service training of auxiliary staff set up in line with 
EU models 
A7. strengthening the existing trainer network by adding and training new Trainers among 
the TCC staff and other personnel from the Romanian judiciary and auxiliary staff 
Result 8 –  A National Strategy of TCC for in-service training of auxiliary staff in line with 
EU requirements – drafted 
A8. to design National Strategy of the in - service training for auxiliary staff following the 
principle of train the trainers 
Result 9– Training for auxiliarry staff in both EC and national legal matters delivered to be 
delivered in line with EU standards 
A9. organize training courses16 for the auxiliary staff (trainees and sitting clerks) involving 
both EU and national trainers. 
Result 10 – Legal documentation on best practice, procedural techniques and legal 
provisions designed for in training course 
A10. - to design and distribute practical manuals as tools to be used for each topic 
debated during training courses 
 
 
                                                 
15 The topics proposed  in the stage design: EC Law ( Consumer protection law, Competition law, Banking and financial law, Environmental law, Labor and social protection, Intellectual property law); 
Human Rights (application of the European Convention of Human Rights in the European states); regional/international cooperation in the fight against organized crime; judicial cooperation in 
criminal matters, new crime areas (computer crimes, economic crime); the evolution of the main concepts in civil law (property law, concept of natural and moral person, moral damages, protection of 
disabled, various types of contracts-including insurance), the judicial responsibility, Ethics of judges, Administration of justice and organization of courts, Access to justice for citizens, Evaluation of 
the quality of justice, The Relation of the judiciary with the civil society, Justice system and mass media. 
16 The following topics will be discussed…: basic civil/criminal procedure, activities developed by the register’s office and by the archives, techniques of drafting procedural documents, computer 
literacy, deontology and ethics, judicial independence and judicial responsibility, administration of justice, organization of courts and evaluation of quality of justice. 
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(ACTIVITIES cont .) 
Component C:  
Creating and strengthening conflict analysis and resolution capacities by introducing 
alternatives means to the judiciary in solving civil and commercial cases 
Result 1 – Recommendation of improving the existing legal framework on alternatives 
means to the judiciary in solving civil and commercial cases drafted in line with EU 
requirements 
A1. -To assess the existing legislation on alternative conflict resolution (mainly the 
provisions on arbitration in commercial issues) 
Result 2 – Best Practice Manual stressing on the features and the advantages of 
mediation in civil, family and commercial disputes drafted 
A2. - to draft a detailed Manual by using the EU model perspectives on the concept of 
each of alternative conflict resolution. (This Manual could be a serious practical 
documentation incorporating not only legal provision of other EU member state but also 
practical experiences faced by those countries in using such alternative means and 
consequences related to the use the judicial procedures (workload of judges, costs etc) 
Result 3 - Proposals for a draft law on mediation 
A3. - to draft proposals for the future legislation on mediation 
Results 4 – Awareness of large segments of beneficiaries (magistrates, lawyers, civil 
society, students) of the concept and advantages of using alternative means in solving 
civil, family and commercial cases 
A4. - to organize an Awareness Forum for representatives of different categories of legal 
professions, civil society, other professions (sociologist, psychologist), students etc. The 
result of the study mentioned above should be discussed together with the action plan 
drafted by the EU experts. 
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Annex 2 
INTERIM EVALUATION NO.R/RO/JHA/0411 
 
Interim Evaluation of the European Union Pre-Accession Instrument PHARE 
Country: Romania 
Sector: Justice and Home Affairs 
Author: ECOTEC (Independent firm of evaluation hired by the Enlargement 
Directorate General, EC) 
Date: 13 January 2005 
 
Scope of the evaluation 
This in- depth Evaluation covers in total 15 programmes within the JHA sector, under 
the following main headings: Justice, Police Co-operation and Fight against Organized 
crime, Schengen System, Fight against corruption ,Money Laundering, Training 
Functions within the Ministry of Administration and Interior, and Cadastre. 
 
Key achievements, findings and recommendations 
All programmes are relevant to beneficiaries needs. Their objectives, although in 
general very complex and ambitious, fully respond to the current requirements of the 
sector and generally reflect the seven conditions upon which the negotiation chapter 
24 JHA was recently closed. 
Although generally just adequately efficient, with good cooperation between 
stakeholders and a flexible approach to activities, implementation was sometime 
affected by the lack of clear information from central  management to regional 
participants regarding the overall programme objectives and by a lack of human 
resources to implement and secure programme initiatives. Of the 14 projects, only one 
cannot be fully rated, as a result of delay implementation. 
Important part of the legislative framework have been revised and harmonized 
and valuable capacity built. Interdisciplinary cooperation has been developed  and new 
structures created. However, it must be noted that limited resources and poor 
infrastructure available affect effectiveness. Also, delays in contracting reduce 
effectiveness of various programs. 
Independence of the Judiciary system is being strengthened and the fight against 
organized crime and corruption enhanced. All investment components will have a 
positive impact, particularly if legislation drafted under current PHARE support is 
adopted and Information Technology infrastructure improved. In both cases, further 
actions are essential, if necessary with PHARE support, to maintain the impact already 
achieved. 
There is good commitment across the sector, important legislation and strategies 
have been or are being developed and some key areas will be strengthened. However, 
only the provision of additional specialized human and financial resources can ensure 
sustainability. Whilst these needs are understood, at present there are no clear 
commitments evident from the Government of Romania, with consequent negative 
implications for sustainability. Also, in domains like anti-corruption and juvenile 
justice, further PHARE support would greatly assist sustainability and these topics 
should be considered as priority areas in future programming. 
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Key recommendations 
 The Government of Romania should ensure adequate levels of human re-
sources and Information technology infrastructure for all key bodies involved 
in the sector by the end of 2005. 
 Implementing Authorities should, with immediate effect, make certain that 
programme objectives and activities are fully understood by stakeholders, par-
ticularly at the regional and local levels. 
 The CFCU and the EC Delegation should provide immediate support to 
Programme Implementation Units in the General Inspectorate of Romanian 
Police and National Agency for Cadastre and real Estate Publicity to ensure 
urgent progress in contract realization for 2003 programes. 
 
Sector sheet 
Number Type of 
assistance 
Programme/ProjectTitle Implementing 
Authority 
2002/000-586.04.16 TWIN Assistance in strengthening the 
independence and functioning 
of the Romanian Judiciary 
system 
Ministry of Justice 
All programs reflect the NPAA 2000-2001. 
 
2. Evaluation Results 
Fourteen programmes under Phare 2002 and 2003 are included within the cluster 
under evaluation. Out of these, thirteen are in advanced stage of implementation and 
are fully evaluated with respect to all five criteria. One 2003 programme is in an early 
stage of implementation, and therefore it is possible to rate only its relevance and 
efficiency. 
 
Justice 
2002/000-586.04.16.Assistance in strengthening the independence and 
functioning of the Romanian Judiciary system 
 
Relevance 
Notwithstanding the closure of negotiation with respect to Chapter 24 in December 
2004, the EU continues to stress the crucial importance of the independence and 
integrity of the courts for the functioning of a democratic society. Further one of the 
seven conditions that were laid down in closing negotiations relates to developing and 
implementing an updated and integrating Action Plan and Strategy for reform of the 
Judiciary in Romania. These subjects are integrally relate to the two Twinnings that are 
part of the programme: strengthening of the functioning of the Romanian judiciary 
and its representative body, the SCM, and further assistance to the NIM and the 
National School of Clerks (NSCC). 
Therefore, relevance is considered ‘satisfactory’. 
 
Efficiency 
The Twinning support to SCM is both timely and appropriate. The PAA, supported 
by MS experts, is closely involved with the evolution of an independent representative 
body for the judiciary. This has included revision to primary legislation, preparation of 
secondary legislation and significant involvement in the realization of the first 
elections of SCM officials in late 2004.There is a close working relationship between 
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the partners. However fundamental question remain with respect to the independence 
of the judiciary, and this inevitably impacts on project outputs. 
Though facing initial problems, including the need to change both Project 
Leaders, changes in the management of NIM, and delays in starting activities, 
twinning support to NIM and NSCC is currently progressing well. However, activities 
have had to be adapted since NIM developed its own strategy, without consultation 
with the PAA. This strategy has subsequently been adopted and twinning and 
twinning support is limited to developing a Road Map for its implementation, 
although the Convenant envisaged a more MS significant input. So far, training 
sessions have been properly organized and know-how transfer is efficient. However, 
in some cases there was a lack of clear information from central management to 
regional participants regarding the overall objectives of the programme and the 
context within which training sessions are taking place. Overall, the programme 
efficiency is rated as ‘barely satisfactory’. Currently the overall disbursement level is 
43.53%(ME 0.70). 
 
Effectiveness 
Both twinings are proving effective in achieving the purpose stated in their respective 
Convenants. Support to the SCM is unquestionably enhancing its institutional capacity 
and functioning, and to a limited extent assisting strengthening of the independence 
of the Judiciary.It is likely that an extension of activities beyond the planned 
completion date of September 2005 will be necessary to ensure the effective 
completion of all tasks.To date the inputs of both the PAA and MS experts have 
contributed significantly to the evolution of the SCM. Twinning activities aimed at 
assisting both NIM and NSCC in strategy development, curriculum development and 
training are contributing effectively in all areas, with the exception of strategy 
development for NIM. The capacity of both institutions to deliver in-service training 
is being significantly enhanced. Training manuals are being prepared that reflect 
current realities in Romania and in wider EU environment, and pools of trainers are 
being created; in total around 60 magistrates and 15 court clerks. The new trainers are 
currently being mentored in follow up training that will benefit by the end of the 
project around 700 magistrates and 420 court clerks. Assistance is being provided to 
both institutions in strategy development and realization. Overall, effectiveness is 
rated as ‘satisfactory’. 
 
Impact 
The impact of both twinning exercises should, in principle, be both positive and 
significant. Their purpose is to contribute to the Romanian programe for 
approximation to and harmonization with European legislation; and specifically to 
contribute to devising and establishing an organizational and administrative structure 
that will guarantee the independence the independence of the Romanian judiciary and 
improve its operation. In as much as the role of the SCM is being enhanced and both 
magistrates and courts of clerks are starting to benefit from a structured continuous 
training programme as well as  being exposed to the practice of law in other MS 
countries, impact can be considered positive. 
However assessment of impact MUST take serious account also of progress in 
the preparation and implementation of a comprehensive strategy for the reform of the 
judiciary, and its associated development as a separate and independent power of the 
state. An action Plan and Strategy for the reform of the Judiciary has been created, 
with significant support from this programme. However , doubts remain with respect 
to the availability of adequate financial and human resources for their implementation 
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and this has a significant effect on impact. GoR is required to submit to the EU by 
March 2005 further documentation to support the realization of the Action Plan and 
Strategy. At this point in time, and in the absence of such documentation, impact is 
rated as ‘barely satisfactory’. 
 
Sustainability 
Both Twinnings are at the mid-stage of implementation, and in both cases strategies 
have already been establish for SCM,NIM and NSCC as well as an overall strategic 
plan for reform of the judiciary. Significant, and positive, initiatives are emerging with 
programme support. The first elections have been concluded for SCM officials, in 
service training programmes are being developed for both magistrates and clerks, and 
trainers equipped with relevant skills and support materials. However, there is 
significant doubt whether these initiatives will be sustained in the absence of external 
support. Twinning support to SCM is working hard to ensure greater independence of 
the judiciary from both internal and external interference, but its realization is far from 
secured. The continuous operation of inspector judges, with a direct involvement in 
the work of their colleagues, raises fundamental questions with respect to 
independence. Similarly, both, in NIM and NSSC, it is unlikely that sufficient funds 
will be made available to maintain in-service training of magistrates and court clerks at 
necessary levels after twinning support is completed. In its 2005 budget NIM was 
granted approximately one quarter of the funds requested for in-service training of 
magistrates. Given the recent change of Government and the clear commitment to 
meeting accession requirements, the prospects for sustainability of programme 
outcomes are improved. However, they [can] still be rated only as ‘barely 
satisfactory’. 
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Annex 3 
List of Acronyms 
CC Candidate Countries 
CFCU Central Financing and Contracting Unit 
EC European Commission 
EU European Union 
IE  Interim Evaluation 
IER Interim Evaluation Report 
ISPA Instrument for Structural Policies For Pre-Accession 
JHA Justice and Home Affairs 
MS Member State 
NPAA National Program for the Adoption of the Aquis 
NSCC National School of Court Clerks ( = TCC) 
NIM National Institute of Magistrates 
PAA Pre-accession Adviser 
PL Project leader 
PHARE Poland and Hungary; Assistance for Restructuring 
Economies 
PCM Policy Cycle Management 
SAPARD Special Accession Program for Agriculture & Rural 
Development 
SCM Superior Council of Magistrates 
TCC Training Centre for Clerks ( = NSCC) 
 
